Mohan Bhagwat’s recent remarks in New York deserve to be examined neither simply as a political statement nor merely as another episode in the long-running Hindu-Muslim controversy. Coming from the head of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh at a significant international gathering, his assertion that a Hindu who believes that Muslims should not have a place in Bharat “will not remain Hindu” is important in its own right. Bhagwat also spoke about the unity of humanity, the dignity of every human being and the Hindu understanding that different paths may lead towards the same ultimate truth. These remarks have been welcomed by some as an affirmation of coexistence and questioned by others because of the RSS’s historical record.
AIMIM leader Asad Ud Din Owaisi responded by describing Bhagwat’s formulation as the “oldest trick” in the RSS playbook and arguing that the present language should be considered alongside the writings and views of earlier RSS leaders and thinkers. Owaisi’s intervention raises a legitimate historical question: how should the conciliatory language of the present RSS leadership be evaluated in relation to the organisation’s earlier understanding of Hindu nationhood? At the same time, the answer cannot be obtained simply by juxtaposing one contemporary speech with selected quotations from the past. The RSS has existed for a century, and its intellectual and organisational history has itself undergone considerable development.
The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was founded by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar in Nagpur in 1925. Hedgewar’s early political life is more complex than is sometimes suggested in contemporary political arguments. He was associated with revolutionary activities and subsequently became active in the Indian National Congress. The RSS’s own historical account records that he participated in the Congress movement, supported the struggle against British rule and was imprisoned for sedition. It also records that he became dissatisfied with Mahatma Gandhi’s emphasis on Hindu-Muslim unity, believing that the principal task should be the organisation and strengthening of Hindu society. Nevertheless, he did not simply abandon the Congress because Muslims participated in the freedom movement; for a period he continued to work within the Congress environment. This distinction matters because contemporary political statements sometimes compress a complicated historical development into a single claim. Hedgewar’s central concern was the organisation of Hindu society, which he regarded as internally divided and therefore unable to provide the social cohesion necessary for national regeneration.
The RSS’s own historical literature continues to describe the organisation’s original purpose in these terms: strengthening and organising Hindu society as the basis of national reconstruction. The more systematic ideological formulation of this approach came under Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar, who became the second Sarsanghchalak of the RSS in 1940. Golwalkar remains one of the most consequential and controversial figures in the history of the organisation. His 1939 book, We, or Our Nationhood Defined, is frequently cited in debates over the RSS’s attitude towards minorities. The book presents nationhood in strongly cultural and civilisational terms and contains passages concerning minorities that have been interpreted as requiring cultural assimilation or subordination to the Hindu national framework. The work is therefore an important primary source for understanding one strand of early RSS thought. Yet a responsible assessment must make an important qualification. The 1939 book should not automatically be treated as a complete and unchanged statement of RSS ideology in 2026. Golwalkar subsequently wrote extensively and developed his thought, while the present RSS itself interprets his legacy in a different manner.
The organisation now describes his conception of Hindu Rashtra primarily in cultural and civilisational terms and emphasises social cohesion, discipline and spiritual unity. This does not make the earlier text historically irrelevant. Nor does it settle the debate over what Golwalkar actually believed. It simply means that the distinction between a historical text and the present-day interpretation of that text must be maintained. A serious assessment should therefore neither suppress Golwalkar’s early writings nor assume that every proposition contained in them continues to function as an unchanged organisational doctrine.
Golwalkar’s long tenure also needs to be viewed in the context of the transformation of the RSS after independence. The organisation faced a major crisis following Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination in January 1948. Nathuram Godse, who assassinated Gandhi, had earlier associations with Hindu nationalist organisations, and the government banned the RSS shortly afterwards. Golwalkar was arrested. The RSS denied organisational involvement in Gandhi’s assassination, and the subsequent judicial and investigative record did not establish that the RSS as an organisation had carried out the assassination. This distinction is essential because historical debate often turns an extremely complicated episode into a simple institutional accusation.
At the same time, the government’s criticism of the RSS in 1948 cannot simply be ignored. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, then Home Minister, wrote to Golwalkar expressing serious concern about communal speeches and about attacks on Muslims. In his correspondence, Patel distinguished between organising and protecting Hindus on the one hand and taking revenge against innocent Muslim men, women and children on the other. He criticised what he regarded as communal rhetoric within sections of the movement. The RSS eventually reorganised itself within the constitutional framework, and the ban was lifted in 1949 after the organisation gave assurances concerning its constitution and its relationship with the national flag and constitutional order.
The post-independence history therefore represents an important stage in the transformation of the organisation from a pre-independence Hindu social movement into a large national organisation operating within India’s constitutional system. The next major development came with the leadership of Madhukar Dattatreya Deoras, who became Sarsanghchalak in 1973. Deoras is particularly important when assessing whether RSS thought has changed over time. He continued to uphold the idea of Hindu Rashtra and Hindu cultural unity, but he also placed considerable emphasis on social reform, the removal of untouchability and the consolidation of Hindu society across caste divisions. The RSS’s centenary accounts today highlight the social-reform initiatives associated with Deoras and his successor Rajju Bhaiya. Deoras also used formulations concerning Indian Muslims and Christians that were broader than some of the language associated with the earlier Golwalkar period. Reports of his speeches indicate that he regarded followers of Islam and Christianity in India as indigenous to the country and argued for their inclusion within the national mainstream, although he continued to use the broader civilisational concept of Hindu culture and Hindu Rashtra. This is an important example of ideological development within the RSS rather than a simple story of complete continuity. The emergence of Mohan Bhagwat as RSS chief brought further emphasis on social harmony and a broader civilisational interpretation of Hindu identity. His recent statements indicate that he does not understand “Hindu” merely as the name of a particular form of religious worship.
In 2025, Bhagwat reportedly described Muslims and Christians as descendants of the same ancestors and argued that there is no “Ahindu” in India in the sense that India’s population shares a common civilisational ancestry. The RSS has similarly described “Hindu” as a civilisational rather than simply a religious category. His latest New York remarks should therefore be understood within this broader development. Bhagwat did not merely say that Muslims should be tolerated. He made the stronger statement that a Hindu who believes that Muslims should not exist in Bharat ceases, in his formulation, to be a Hindu. He also invoked the unity of humanity and the Hindu idea that different religious paths can lead towards the same ultimate truth. There is a significant positive element in this formulation.
“The history of the RSS—from Hedgewar to Bhagwat—is defined by evolution and internal debate rather than static continuity or total reform. Ultimately, the true measure of Bhagwat’s vision is whether its core assertion—that Muslims are an integral part of India—can transition from rhetoric into a lasting standard for national and constitutional life.”
Whatever one’s political or ideological position, an explicit statement from the head of the RSS rejecting the exclusion of Muslims from India is important. It directly contradicts any understanding of Hindu nationalism that would regard Muslims as foreigners who have no legitimate place in the country. Bhagwat’s statement should therefore be acknowledged on its own terms rather than dismissed merely because it comes from the RSS. The question raised by Owaisi, however, concerns the relationship between this contemporary formulation and the RSS’s historical intellectual inheritance. That question is also legitimate. The RSS cannot reasonably object when historians examine its past writings and compare them with its present statements. At the same time, critics should recognise that ideological organisations can change, reinterpret earlier formulations and develop new approaches. The mere existence of earlier controversial writings does not prove that every later statement is insincere. The more substantive question is therefore whether Bhagwat’s present formulation represents a genuine evolution in the meaning of Hindu Rashtra and Hindu cultural nationalism. This is where the debate becomes more nuanced. Bhagwat appears to use “Hindu” in a broad civilisational sense. From the RSS perspective, this permits Muslims, Christians and other communities to remain faithful to their own forms of worship while sharing a common cultural and national inheritance. The RSS’s own literature consistently presents this as an inclusive civilisational understanding.
Critics, however, can reasonably ask a different question: why should an Indian Muslim or Christian have to be included within the category “Hindu,” even in a civilisational sense, in order to establish his or her belonging to India? A constitutional conception of citizenship begins from equality before the law. Under such a framework, a Muslim does not need to accept a Hindu cultural description of his identity to establish that he is fully Indian. This is perhaps the most important conceptual difference in the present debate. Bhagwat’s formulation seeks to make the Hindu civilisational category sufficiently broad to accommodate religious diversity. The constitutional approach, by contrast, does not require the nation to be defined through any particular religious or civilisational category in the first place. These approaches can coexist in practice, but they are not philosophically identical.
The phrase “Hindu Rashtra” therefore remains central to the debate. Bhagwat and the RSS generally describe it as a civilisational concept rather than a theocratic state. Critics remain concerned that defining the nation primarily through Hindu civilisation can place minorities in the position of being guests within a cultural framework defined by the majority. The resolution of this debate depends less on terminology than on the practical meaning attached to it. If Hindu Rashtra means that every citizen—Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain or otherwise—is equally Indian, equally protected and equally entitled to preserve his or her religious identity, then the term is being used in a very different sense from a political system based on religious discrimination. If, however, minority citizens are expected to demonstrate their loyalty by accepting a particular cultural definition of national identity, legitimate questions about equality and citizenship remain.
The historical evolution of the RSS makes it difficult to sustain either of two extreme interpretations. It would be inaccurate to say that nothing has changed since the days of Hedgewar and Golwalkar. The organisation’s language, social activities, political environment and engagement with different sections of society have changed considerably. It would also be inaccurate to say that all elements of the older Hindu-nationalist conception have disappeared. The RSS continues to speak of Hindu society, Hindu cultural identity and Hindu Rashtra. The present position is therefore best understood as a combination of continuity and reinterpretation. The continuity lies in the belief that India’s national identity is fundamentally rooted in Hindu civilisation. The evolution lies in the increasingly explicit assertion that Muslims and Christians are part of that civilisation and that their continued presence in India is not inconsistent with the RSS’s conception of Bharat.
Bhagwat’s New York statement is significant precisely because it strengthens the second element. It makes exclusion of Muslims incompatible, in his own formulation, with being a true Hindu. That is a meaningful development in public discourse and should be recognised as such. At the same time, the most convincing evidence of ideological change will not ultimately be a single speech in New York. It will be the sustained articulation of the same principle in India, in the RSS’s relations with Muslim and Christian communities, and in its response to situations involving communal tension. This is why the question raised by critics about consistency is legitimate, just as Bhagwat’s statement itself deserves to be taken seriously. A balanced assessment should therefore resist both political dismissal and political celebration. Owaisi is entitled to draw attention to historical RSS texts and ask whether the present leadership has moved sufficiently far from earlier formulations. Bhagwat, for his part, has made a clear contemporary statement rejecting the exclusion of Muslims from Bharat. The historical record demonstrates that the RSS has evolved, but it also demonstrates that the central civilisational conception of Hindu nationhood has remained important to the organisation.
The significance of the present moment lies precisely in this tension between continuity and change. The most constructive way forward would be to judge the present RSS leadership not solely by the most controversial statements of its predecessors, but neither solely by its most conciliatory contemporary speeches. Both the historical record and the present record deserve examination. The question should be whether the contemporary RSS can reconcile its civilisational understanding of Hindu Rashtra with an unambiguous principle of equal citizenship in which Muslims and Christians are free to remain religiously and culturally distinct while being fully and unconditionally Indian. Bhagwat’s New York statement moves in the direction of coexistence by explicitly rejecting the idea that Muslims should be absent from India. That should be acknowledged without qualification. Whether it represents a deeper transformation of the RSS’s understanding of nationhood, however, is a question that can be answered only through sustained evidence over time.
The history from Hedgewar through Golwalkar, Deoras and Bhagwat is therefore neither a simple story of ideological continuity nor a straightforward story of complete transformation. It is a history of adaptation, reinterpretation and continuing debate. A mature public discussion should recognise all three dimensions. The real test of Bhagwat’s message is consequently not whether it is applauded by his supporters or rejected by his critics. It is whether the principle embedded in his statement—that Muslims are an integral and legitimate part of Bharat and that hostility towards their presence is incompatible with the highest conception of Hindu identity—can become a consistent and enduring principle of social and national life. That is a question on which history, constitutionalism and contemporary political practice must ultimately converge.
(The author a veteran academician is a former Professor and Head Department of Islamic Studies, Kashmir University. The views, opinions and conclusions expressed in this article are those of the author and aren’t necessarily in accord with the views of “Kashmir Horizon”)
[email protected]
